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The Productive City
Recent years have witnessed a substantial extension of thoughts and work 
on cities in Africa. Much of this work has tried to get out of the conceptual 
frameworks that usually render African cities as failed cities, cities always 
in need of something more — whether it be infrastructure, governance, or 
economic development. As David Satterthwaite so ably demonstrates, cit-
ies in the global South in general are caught in a series of powerful myths 
that represent them as more parasitic and more economically fragmented 
than cities elsewhere.1 The prevailing notion is that of an urban fabric 
overrun, unable to accommodate all of the escalating demands made of 
it; of environmental degradation spawned by widespread impoverishment; 
and of increased social conflict among residents who find few institutional 
platforms to promote coherence and collaboration. In the following dis-
cussion, I emphasize the implications of trying to see the emerging fabric 
of urban Africa as the result of a productive deployment of sensibilities, 
practices, effort, and collective formations that are made possible by the 
very uncertainties incumbent within cities deeply punctuated by frag-
mented infrastructures, social contestation over the uses to be made of the 
city, and political regimes thoroughly made partial through their entan-
glement within diverse networks of exchange.2 In particular, this essay 
deals with the often peculiar process through which actors come to make 
their mark on collective transactions and the way in which idiosyncratic 
constellations of such actors provide a workable balance between the pro-
visional and incessantly mutating practices required to viably “make do” 
in most African cities and a sense of order, if only temporary.
Emergency Democracy  
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Taking a view of the essential productivity of urban effort has broad 
ramifications for notions of what gets valorized and how, and it reorients 
social economies based on inclusion and exclusion. Although efforts to 
expand and regularize broad-based political participation may be criti-
cal to viable urban life, the emphasis on such a formula — popular public 
participation as a conduit to increased democratization as a conduit to live-
lihood generation and the cultivation of responsible provisioning by gov-
ernment — tends to occlude the prolific and real political struggles waged 
to maintain the capacity, possibility, and right to create different ways of 
living in the city.3 These practices of keeping things open are what I call 
emergency democracy — the disentangling of emergence and emergency is 
impossible, and thus the practice demands the potential resourcefulness of 
relatively invisible architectures of sometimes highly dispersed collabora-
tion among actors who may or may not know they are indeed collaborating. 
As such, increasing swaths of African urban life are characterized by the 
proliferation of provisional, even experimental “municipal actions” where 
residents concretely upend a wide range of sectoral and social distinc-
tions — private and public, religious and secular, local and translocal — in 
order to be greater involved in a broader range of lives and events. By find-
ing ways to expand their own circuits of movement across the city (and 
sometimes other cities), residents bring together people and things that 
otherwise might remain disconnected. These webs of intersection open up 
new uses for ordinary objects and infrastructure, thus altering what they 
mean and what their value might be. This essay explores these dimensions 
of such emergency democracy in a major slum upgrading project in a sub-
urb of Dakar, a marginal space in the urban geography, and the operations 
of a neighborhood market in Douala, Cameroon. 
Some Historical Antecedents
The entanglements between civility and incivility, formal and informal, 
urban and rural, extraversion and parochialism, highly fixed identities 
and rhizomelike associations are not universal in African cities. They do, 
however, show up as some kind of legacy in specific domains and quar-
ters across the continent. In the early settlement of colonial cities, some 
quarters manifested a fairly straightforward reproduction of village life. 
Others were simply transition zones for highly mobile labor. Still others 
reflected an intricate interlacing of trends, identities, and influences.
Older quarters of cities retained forms of local accumulation and 
regulation based on clearly understood and respected systems of local, 
commonly religious, authority — with their concomitant networks of enter-
prise and social welfare. Public salaries supported a heterogeneous range 
of extended family members, clients, and activities anchored in a logic 
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that livelihood was best attained through securing diverse and relevant 
positions within and across multiple networks. Substantiality in the urban 
public sphere was largely created through the sheer intricacies and entan-
glements of various strands of everyday life, which without such entangle-
ments might only barely function in their own terms. In other words, the 
ability of households, social institutions, economic organizations, religious 
groups, and judiciaries to do what was expected of them (something not 
always definitively clear in endogenous and exogenous terms of efficacy) 
necessitated complex interactions along highly porous boundaries.4
So while a broad range of “traditional” institutions persisted, the 
configuration of urban solidarity, realized at primarily local, neighborhood 
levels, occurred through an interpretation of domains and sectors rather 
than through the consolidation of citizenship within well-defined and 
well-managed “modern” institutions.5 Religion, business, politics, social 
welfare, training, mutual support, and identity claims intersected with 
each other, so that any modality of association wasn’t really disconnected 
from any other.6 While such arrangements provided multiple opportunities 
for problem-solving, especially the ability to compensate during times of 
crisis in what were largely fluid urban environments, they did often limit 
the generation of new forms of independent action and innovation that 
could be brought to the larger public sphere. The interdependencies among 
religion, governance, politics, family life, and business also meant that the 
stakes were high for any shift in the internal dynamics of any one sector. 
Again, the locus of independent action is constrained, at the same time as 
the resolution of any particular difficulty within one sector was potentially 
given the influences and resources of another.
As the city grew and extended into more provisional, unserviced, 
and informalized settlements, the conventional rules and networks that 
governed most aspects of life in many of the older quarters found limited 
applicability — with points of entry and mechanisms for survival more 
diffused across often competing practices and associations.7 Everyday life 
depended on more provisional assemblages of resources and alliances.8 
The explosiveness of urban growth has meant that the entry into the urban 
system over the past decade, while remaining largely family based, was not 
as thoroughly controlled or inscribed in the wide net of social and family 
relations that formerly had situated the new urban immigrant within a more 
comprehensive or ordered field of activities and obligations.9
Intensifying economic difficulties have reaffirmed in some respects 
the salience of extended family networks as the primary locus of livelihood 
formation. Increases in the cost of health and schooling often produce a 
more blatant stratification of opportunities within these networks, as some 
children can be sent to school or provided other kinds of support, whereas 
others cannot. Under circumstances of economic hardship, labor mobiliza-
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tion once again becomes important, as youth, in particular, “donate” their 
labor in return for promises of future support. In some cities, while family 
size through increased birthrates has declined, average household size may 
increase due to tendencies to form households on the basis of both kin and 
nonkinship relations possessing complementary skills and advantages.10 
But overall, the ability of extended family systems to manage increased 
economic difficulties has grown more precarious.
A critical question then becomes the extent to which the extension 
and substantiation of associational life in new, more diverse forms is related 
to the diminution of extended family capacities, as well as embodying 
urban survival logics and strategic approaches to urban livelihood that 
reflect practices that are neither rural or urban or, conversely, that consti-
tute elements of a progressive transformation of African urban life.11 These 
are not mutually contradictory possibilities, so the thrust of new research 
endeavors might be to more comprehensively examine what new modalities 
of associational life are being used for — particularly in the elaboration of 
new livelihoods.12
African residents developed specific places and domains for being 
specific things and for accommodating what were often contradictory 
needs and aspirations. There were places to keep tradition alive and there 
were places to be modern, places to be a kinsman and places to be a cos-
mopolitan urban dweller, as well as more textured and subtle combinations 
of these primarily artificial polarities. This process of spatializing memory, 
options, and alternatives had a large effect on making African use of the 
city as dynamic as possible.13
There were limits on how strict such spatializing could be. After all, 
different facets of African everyday life and identity had to nurture each 
other under often rigid colonial and postcolonial controls. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of clear sectoral boundaries is viewed by most urban pro-
fessionals as an important step in the consolidation of effective municipal 
regulatory environments. To delink religious life from the political, the 
political from the entrepreneurial, or the familial from the public may, 
however, weaken African urban societies. In cities facing many different 
kinds of crises, this interdependency means that the resolution of any 
particular difficulty within one sector is potentially availed the influences 
and resources of any other. 
On the other hand, the intermeshing of sectors may not create suf-
ficient space for changes to take hold within the operations of individual 
spheres of activity, be they religious, political, economic, or familial. With-
out this space, it may be difficult to generate new forms of independent 
action and innovation that could be brought to the larger public sphere. If 
changes in how local politics operate are seen as having substantial effects 
on how religion, business, family life, and community affairs are practiced, 
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people will be cautious about bringing about such political change. This 
is because too many dimensions of life may be at stake, and independent 
action is limited.
The Difference between Interlocutors and Partners
Even though diverse actors can collaborate to reach heightened economic 
opportunities across the world, it has been another matter to use these 
often very sophisticated arrangements to take care of local development 
issues, such as sanitation, waste collection, and other aspects of neighbor-
hood improvement.
Take the situation in Yeumbeul South, one of the sixteen localities 
making up the municipality of Pikine in Dakar — and a situation that has 
been widely documented by the Projet de Ville undertaken by the Program 
on Popular Urban Economy of Environmental Development Action in the 
Third World (ECOPOP, ENDA Tiers Monde) over the last decade. At 
the height of a major municipal redevelopment project in the mid-1990s, 
the then-mayor attempted to dominate every facet of life and development 
within the ward, in part by trying to play off different associations against 
each other. He neither supported the process of community mobilization 
and development nor entered the scene with specific proposals and prac-
tices of his own. Instead, he used his position as a means of distorting the 
dynamic yet contested and volatile process of community restructuring 
that was under way. Here, municipal “authority” was constituted almost 
by default, as the mayor played on the convergence of opportunity and 
vulnerability that usually characterizes a community in transition.
The shortage of potable water in Yeumbeul had been particularly 
acute, and sanitation problems had reached crisis proportions. A partner-
ship composed of UNESCO’s Managing Social Transformations Program, 
ENDA Tiers Monde, and several grassroots organizations — the Associa-
tion des Jeunes de Yeumbeul pour la Promotion Sociale, the Association 
des Jeunes pour l’Education et le Développement, the Union des Frères de 
Yeumbeul, and the Association pour le Bien Etre de la Population — under-
took to increase the supply of potable water in the two wards, as well as 
improve sanitation. The first phase of this effort, which began in 1996, 
provided five communal water taps and seventy-five ventilated pit latrines, 
as well as a system of solid waste collection via horse-drawn cart. 
As these inputs were to be locally managed, a capacity building 
program was implemented to train local residents in maintaining the 
infrastructure, as well as in administering the financial aspects of the 
service delivery system. A community management committee and tech-
nical committee for maintenance and repair were established. This initia-
tive introduced needed infrastructure and improved waste collection and 
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sanitation. It instituted important local administrative structures in order 
to improve environmental management and the management of extralocal 
services and political relations. The project also amplified challenges that 
were widespread throughout Pikine, as well as other cities.
As resources were scarce, the initial phases of such a project are able 
to introduce only limited improvements in infrastructure capacity. If only a 
limited number of water taps can be provided, where they are to be located 
is important, as is who will have what kind of access to them. Certainly, an 
important consideration in locating such taps, depending on whether they 
are reticulated to natural wells or to the bulk supply system, is the ease and 
costs entailed. Given the costs and technical complexities, certain locations 
are more viable than others in engineering terms. How do these locations 
correspond with the most viable “social” locations within a community? 
How does the process guarantee that the diverse interests and capacities of 
the community have access not only to the resource, but to the possibilities 
of deliberating the disposition of that resource? These were considerations 
subject to intense debate in the Yeumbeul project.
The associations in Yeumbeul also reflected varying points of view, 
capacities, and interests. They range from the representatives of traditional 
authorities to more politically militant youth groups. How can often widely 
divergent orientations to everyday community life — with their own visions 
about well-being and the future — collaborate over important decisions 
such as the distribution of essential resources within the community? Asso-
ciations are implicitly strengthened by virtue of their capacity to deliver 
needed services to the community. Therefore, the disposition of develop-
ment products becomes a locus of competition among associations. 
Resources such as water and electricity, and services such as waste 
collection and environment cleansing, cannot always be provided house-
to-house. Accordingly, how are they most judiciously targeted in such a 
way that will promote efficient use and social cooperation? If grassroots 
management processes are the best means of ensuring a judicious public 
character to resource provision and use, what are the most appropriate 
structures to ensure efficient management? 
Efforts were made in Yeumbeul to ensure broad representation on 
these local management structures. Much time, however, was also wasted 
negotiating who was to be responsible for particular facets of the project. 
In management, decisions often have to be made quickly and decisively. 
Tariffs must be collected for the use of the resource in order for it to be 
maintained. Having too many hands involved in the management process 
subjects it to excessive political considerations. Therefore, much effort 
was spent in Yeumbeul trying to figure out what specific actors could do 
best. Potential lines of equivalence among discrete tasks were drawn. If, 
for example, representatives of the traditional Lebu authorities were not 
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involved in managing the construction of latrines or financing the charette 
pick-up systems, then their roles chairing irregular meetings with the 
public water agency could be widely viewed as a task having equivalent 
importance or prestige.
Development inputs and their management change the character of a 
community. They change the nature of what residents have to consider in 
order to get water or lighting. Successful access concerns not only appro-
priate social considerations, but technical ones as well. These technical 
considerations require specific levels of education. Traditional authorities 
frequently lack the education to understand many of these basic techni-
cal considerations. Many cannot even read or write. They are frequently 
threatened when critical features of community life seem to pass from 
their competence and control. Those local actors with sufficient educa-
tion can then use their more proficient understanding of technical matters 
to shape the community in ways that exceed the once relied-upon social 
norms and hierarchies. 
At the same time, as new modalities of resource and service provision 
can alter these social hierarchies, they also must be respected in order to 
prevent subterfuge. Additionally, working through customary practices 
may be an effective way of convincing people to change their behaviors in 
ways better suited to the service provided. Improved service also means 
that people must pay for it. Therefore, consumers must be persuaded that 
the benefits of improved service outweigh the sacrifices entailed in mobiliz-
ing scarce resources for maintaining it. In localities where improvements 
in living conditions tend to center around various locally initiated projects 
and the mobilization of local funds, a saturation point is frequently reached 
where the costs involved in attempting to sustain these initiatives are seen 
as too high.
At the same time, the more “modern” associations are concerned that 
it may take some time before the new patterns of social behavior and coop-
eration establish themselves. These new patterns of behavior are necessary 
in order to make the most beneficial use of new levels of service provision 
and access to resources. In the interim, the lingering power of customary 
authorities could be mobilized around these new development inputs to 
reiterate and entrench inequitable patterns of access and use. These ineq-
uities could be particularly unfavorable to the women and youth whose 
activism and role in environmental management has been most critical. 
In these circumstances, it is important to establish some mechanisms of 
financial autonomy.
In Yeumbeul, an investment fund was started in order to generate 
income that would ensure an available pool of money to maintain these 
services. In order to establish such a fund, a series of income-generating 
opportunities was set in motion. These opportunities were targeted par-
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ticularly to those whose economic circumstances would not permit even the 
most minimal financial contributions to service use in the future. The poor 
need to access independent incomes in order to contribute to enhanced 
levels of service delivery and development in their communities. As a result, 
they also become less available to the patronage or manipulation of more 
powerful interests within the locality.
The role of ENDA ECOPOP centered on maximizing points of 
contact and negotiation among actively or potentially discordant interests 
within the community. Once these intersections are more thoroughly 
entrenched in the life of the community, the direct role played by such 
an NGO can diminish. During the first phase of the Yeumbeul project, 
associations remained quite weak and vulnerable. This was the case even 
for those organizations that had been formally in existence for some time. 
Their willingness to deal with each other was also largely predicated on 
their sense that they had little choice but to deal with each other, given 
their relative isolation and lack of access to broader institutional networks. 
Associations have been strengthened through this development process, 
and they increasingly become sites of conflict themselves. There are more 
opportunities for individual groups to establish alliances with other insti-
tutions and associations outside the locality in order to consolidate their 
internal strength.
Increasingly, the protocols worked out in some kind of partnership 
arrangements among agencies providing technical assistance, municipal 
government, and a thickened and more complicated tapestry of local asso-
ciations for managing the political relations in communities like Yeumbeul 
find difficulty both encompassing the shifting alliances, but also in getting 
actors to “speak the same language.” While different associational actors 
pursuing affiliations and opportunities in wider networks of action may 
still share a basic sense about the position of “their locality” within a larger 
municipal, regional, or global arena, the heterogeneity of these pursuits 
also makes it more difficult for them to formally concur on issues increas-
ingly understood and mediated through multiple discourses. In Yeumbeul 
particularly, these have included intensified renderings of Islamism, techni-
cal planning languages, reinvoked pan-Africanism, feminism, ecological 
consciousness, and a home-styled cultural radicalism. Actors increasingly 
rely on a variety of provisional mechanisms, including much informal local 
networking, to transmit information and to conduct negotiations. Again, 
a very particular social architecture is elaborated — with a range of chan-
nels, conduits, barriers, and circumventions inside and outside — in order 
to attain a semblance of local coherence.
As Jacques Rancière indicates, interlocutors are not partners, in 
that their interchanges are not based on some common assumption about 
what brings them together or an idea that their togetherness is based on 
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advancing some common project. Rather, to be interlocutors is to open up 
the possibility of some alternative kind of communication that itself may 
generate new ways of working.14
Politics, Invisibility, and the Governing Composite
Eric Tchoyi is the chief of the Bepanda market. It is a small civil position 
equipped with a variety of ordinances, levies, sanctions, reprimands, 
licenses, and concessions. It is a neighborhood market, with most of the 
inputs derived from the major Douala markets of Congo and Madagas-
car. There are some exceptions in terms of produce delivered direct from 
periurban gardens. But there is no dearth of complexity entailed. Much of 
marketing is straightforward: the commerçant buys in some bulk, usually 
with others, divides the goods, transports them to a local market such as 
Bepanda, and retails the items at a small markup, always recalibrating 
the value of the convenience that such local marketing provides with the 
lower prices associated with securing the item at a major market. Tchoyi 
must preside over the allocation of stalls and the balancing of sectors, 
making sure that a range of goods and services can be housed across the 
market. He must ensure the accessibility of vendors, so that those who 
are hawking by foot or who line outside the official retailing spaces do 
not interfere excessively with the business of those who are more station-
ary within the interior of the market itself. He must act against excessive 
price-fixing, where the complicit hoarding of goods or the underpricing 
of them by those retailers who are working in collusion with others is used 
to undermine competitors. He must make sure that certain standards of 
cleanliness and safety are adhered to, and that revenue collection is timely 
and comprehensive. Again, for all of these tasks he is equipped with cer-
tain administrative powers.
However, like all kinds of economic transactions, marketing practices 
have also been intentionally complicated in order to derive value from 
attaining a more diverse series of synergies between the delivery of spe-
cific goods and services with the constraints and possibilities of particular 
capacities of consumption. In a place like Bepanda, available income is 
seldom regularized; it comes and goes in erratic rhythms of accumulation 
and need. As many households depend on members’ remittances from 
elsewhere, their purchasing practices increasingly shift from a weekly 
or daily purchase of basic inputs — the practices that these local markets 
most directly addressed. In order to better capture their consumption, 
local retailers configure specific deals whereby purchases on credit or paid 
for in advance are worked out, or increasingly where a portion of money 
earned by the migrant is remitted directly to the commerçant, who releases 
an agreed upon volume of goods at specific intervals. Arrangements are 
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even made among a group of distinct retailers, all selling different kinds of 
goods, to bundle diverse items into a specific package that is then subject 
to a negotiated price with a group of households. 
These complexities have been added on to a market already thick with 
a range of symbolic and relational economies. The purchase of a particular 
item, such as a kilo of tomatoes or a package of ten children’s track suits, 
was always more than the attainment of the commodity itself. Measures 
themselves were always variable, depending not only on the identity of the 
consumer, but also on the time of year, the amount to be purchased, and 
the intention of the purchase itself. Even in a local market where residents 
are usually highly familiar with one another, most purchases are accom-
panied by some conversation, usually small talk, but sometimes important 
information and gossip about the health of associates held in common, local 
and city events, and the prices of many things. 
Markets are thick with talk, and thus with impressions, rumors, inter-
pretations. Potential customers are always steered toward or away from cer-
tain opportunities not only for consumption, but also for exchange — you 
do this for me, I will do this for you; I know that this is going on; do you 
want to come in on it. The this and the it may refer to places to live, goods 
to acquire, places to work. Everyone in a neighborhood like Bepanda is 
looking for small advantages, more things and opportunities to acquire 
for less. Whether they have any sanctioned belonging there or not, hun-
dreds of people, neither buyer nor seller, use the market every day to make 
something happen, to see who they might see, to take or be taken into 
some scheme. Given these needs, there is much room for dissimulation; 
much room for making things seem as if they are real when they are not, or 
making them real simply through the sheer mobilizing of money, interest, 
or support on the part of those schemed or part of making a scheme. The 
market becomes the site of such incessant jockeying, of turning transac-
tions into an opportunity to perform more than the transaction itself. 
While Tchoyi’s institutional toolbox provides him with some instru-
ments that enable him to maintain some order, they are not really adapted 
to the complexities of the transactions for which the market provides a con-
text. Adding to the complexity is the fact that local government, the Douala 
municipality, and the national state — who share at various levels in the 
welfare of Bepanda — provide little in the way of employment generation, 
livelihood formation, infrastructure, or social services. In neither policy 
nor programming do these levels of the state facilitate social cohesion, 
complementarity, knowledge production, or a viable division of labor and 
social stratification that does not have to be incessantly renegotiated. 
In terms of the rules and regulations that officially govern the mar-
ket, things then have to get out of hand in order to really work. In other 
words, clear demarcations among sectors, buyers and sellers, licensed 
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and unlicensed retailers, mobile hawkers and stationary commerçants, and 
locals and strangers cannot really stay put in order for any transaction to 
exceed the surface appearances necessary in order for some surplus, profit, 
or advantage to be garnered. The generation of such surpluses creates a 
market of ambiguities. It is not always clear what actually is being gained, 
who is actually working together, or who is actually making money, com-
ing out ahead. There are so many settlements of past obligations mixed 
with hedges on the future — transactions geared toward cultivating the 
possibility that at a future time, loans might be made, large quantities of 
rice might be accessed for a very low price, individuals might be available 
for sexual encounters, or wealthy visiting uncles might be introduced to 
aspiring young students — that it is seldom clear what is being bought and 
sold.
What governs this ambiguity, keeping things that must get out of 
hand from getting too much out of hand? As Tchoyi himself indicates, 
he must depend on the rule of the invisible in order to do his job. This 
invisible sometimes entails various facets of divine intervention or sorcery 
but has, according to the chief, a more quotidian dimension. Tchoyi is the 
chief of the market, but he is able to be chief only through a dispersal of 
administrative power through a composite of actors whose identities may 
shift but whose characteristics remain somewhat stable. In other words, 
the “real” chief is a hybridized entity of local residents, whose combined 
actions and features are able to get the bulk of participants in the market 
to see all that transpires according to a basically shared, if flexibly drawn, 
point of view. 
At a certain point each day, as Tchoyi would point out, a local healer 
would pass through the market to buy herbs. According to the time of day, 
this visit would correspond either with that of a young man who headed a 
local youth development committee taking particular interest in organiz-
ing young boys who worked the three-wheel carts that transported goods 
between markets, stores, and households; or with an owner of a series of 
buildings contiguous to the market whose family owned large tracts of land 
in Bamenda, a Bamileke town in the northwest of Cameroon from which 
many families in Bepanda had their origin. 
These latter visits also coincided with those of a Madame Ngouna, 
who over the years had parlayed her dominance of local cassava retailing 
into a series of flour processing workshops across Douala and who returned 
frequently to Bepanda to buy small items such as lingerie or toothpaste 
from a large number of retailers simply as a symbolic gesture, and a ser-
geant in the gendarme who would buy large quantities of sweets to hand 
out to children coming out at the end of their school days as an occasion 
to lecture them on the need to get a good education, and who was widely 
viewed as someone powerful enough to keep the neighborhood relatively 
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free in recent years of the arbitrary military raids that had been a common 
feature throughout the prior decade. The paths of these personalities all 
would cross, usually daily. Who they spoke with and how became key top-
ics of speculation, and the instructions, advice, or admonitions they would 
give acted as momentary anchors to the pursuant conversations those in 
the market would have with each other. The words of these personalities 
themselves were not as important as the fact that they were able to mobilize 
attention, first by the inordinate attention that these individuals paid to 
each other, and then as a means of engaging particular buyers and sellers 
in the market that they would otherwise not notice.
Crucial to this process is an economy of generosity applied and with-
drawn. Given the intense needs of a mostly impoverished community, the 
availability of offerings of goods and services that go beyond what can be 
afforded has long been an instrument that solidifies affiliation and loyalty. 
It provides the platform from which individuals might sustain a sense 
of hopefulness, a sense that it is possible to go beyond what is presently 
experienced. So when such generosity is withdrawn, individuals are left 
disoriented. They will find it difficult to access the support and collabora-
tion of those who remain the recipients of generosity or aspire to it. 
Such generosity has become even more significant as the criteria 
of equivalence in transactions are being stretched to encompass larger 
demands and more domains. For example, at funerals, weddings, and 
birthing ceremonies, extended family units now frequently will be asked 
to provide a specific quantity of meat, rice, alcohol, or services such as 
influence with government officials or sex as a guarantor of keeping those 
attending the ceremony from the consequences of witchcraft. One can 
observe requests in the market for idiosyncratic quantities of items, espe-
cially on days when a major ceremony is occurring in the neighborhood. So 
.63 kilos of chicken gizzards may come to equal 3 large bottles of beer; or 
3.66 kilos of rice come to equal a two-paragraph letter of introduction from 
a local chief to the principal of a secondary school. At times these numbers 
have specific meanings in terms of people’s ages, addresses, or other, more 
opaque, references to numerology. But the terrain of equivalence is being 
stretched, and a form of mutual extortion comes to characterize more daily 
exchanges. Within such an environment, then, an economy of generosity 
is all the more important.
For those Tchoyi sees and relies upon as constituting the “governing 
composite,” there is little in their official positions that warrant them either 
individually or collectively from being eligible to assume such temporary 
power. Each possesses a particular capacity that provides them a basis to 
exert some authority — whether it be land ownership, customary ties, suc-
cessful businesses, or influence among a certain group of the local popu-
lation. But Bepanda has other, often more powerful local figures — local 
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chiefs, Bamileke entrepreneurs, politicians, religious leaders, or mafia 
heads, for example. Although each of these personalities Tchoyi identifies 
has a reputable and substantial position, they are all, with the possible 
exception of Madame Ngouna, tangential to the activities of the market 
itself. These are not the major wholesalers and producers; these are not 
the movers and shakers of the big entrepreneurial networks that control 
the big production and distribution networks.
The procedures that make up their precise role in the Bepanda 
market are not so clear, nor are the precise qualifications that make them 
eligible for fulfilling such a role. They are not so easily identifiable as the 
purveyors of certain actions, interpretations, impressions, knowledge dis-
semination, or mobilizations to which the market gives rise. In other words, 
given the volatility of markets as sites for the generation of surplus values 
and collaborations of all kinds, they are potentially dangerous places for 
the production of untamed socialities. While the “governing composite” 
may, as claimed by Tchoyi, keep such sociality from really getting out of 
hand, the dominant political interests of the city will see in the market 
always a potential countervailing force to its rule — and with good reason, 
as markets have been sites of insurrection in Douala in the past. As such, 
those who are at least implicitly steering market transactions and particular 
negotiations in specific directions, even if simply by constituting points of 
reference through which circulations of conversation, interpretation, and 
performance pass, most strategically operate by virtue of not being readily 
identifiable by official political power. Thus we have Tchoyi’s version of 
the invisible hand of the market.
Such invisible governance, while relying on this composite of actors, 
will, as Tchoyi’s own account of his history as market chief demonstrates, 
experience some degree of interchangeability. Different actors will make up 
this composite, all having some kind of larger credibility that can be easily 
and widely recognized, but not directly derivative from specific positions 
of authority, not rooted in a specific formula whereby the composite is a 
homegrown version of an intersectoral partnership — one part customary 
authority, one part business representation, one part civil society, and so 
forth. At times the “network is cut”15 and specific people, embodying the 
crystallization of multiple transactions, stand out and appear to be the 
drivers of influence and change.
In the composite at hand during my discussions with Tchoyi, each 
participant was propelled into the market by specific consumption needs — 
herbs, lingerie, and candy, for example. In part, these consumption needs 
were particular enough to make each stand out as a particular kind of 
“regular customer” and a regularized interruption from a norm of buying 
that was, in turn, being substantially reconfigured and particularized to 
the diverse consumption profiles of households in the community. 
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But Tchoyi also indicates that each of these people embodies a wide 
series of connections to various facets of life in Bepanda, through their own 
personal histories, networks, and affiliations, so that their mutual coinci-
dence in the market provides a site and occasion for there to be a symbolic 
condensation and then rendering of the coming together of these various 
facets of life in a way that is visible to those who spend a great deal of their 
lives in the market but not to those who have reoriented their political and 
economic lives to standing outside and above it. What is mobilized is the 
common sense that something significant is taking place, and that this 
mobility of actors making up a governing composite brings buyers and 
sellers in the market into particular connections by positing the possibility 
of understanding just what may be going on in the scores of negotiations, 
provisional accommodations, deals, bargains, and complicities taken not 
in their entirety, but in multiples that exceed the one by one. In order to 
subsist, the players in the market need to understand the complex games, 
so in this way, they are ready to pay attention.
Given the heightened state of ambiguity the market produces, where 
goods and services, as well as individuals, are being converted into uses of 
all kinds, where the acts of buying and selling become more particularized, 
and where each transaction attempts to attain some surfeit of meaning and 
possibility, there exists the potential for the parochial — the reterritorializa-
tion of interactions within smaller domains of familiarity and trust — even 
though such narrowing of the circle of affiliation may go against the grain 
of the extensionality required by limited resources. 
The politics affected by this governing composite facilitates circu-
lation, keeps things open in a way that provides a measure of focus and 
stability — some kind of guarantee against the openness of transactions 
simply dissipating without the consolidation and scale necessary to make 
things happen — whether those things be the assurance of steady sup-
ply of food, of transporting goods from one place to another, of pooling 
money and time to access things cheaply and in some sizable quantity, 
and importantly, of keeping people in some kind of concerted action and 
thus being able to reach larger swaths of the city, in terms of more people, 
more space, more possibilities. 
These market politics, informed and sometimes haunted by the 
intersecting political and economic practices that shape, enliven, and 
constrain specific possibilities of actions, are sometimes cited as impor-
tant references and sometimes kept out of view. Cameroon was built from 
the agglomeration of two distinct colonial legacies, British and French, 
anglophone and francophone — an amalgamation that appears stabilized 
at times by the embittered remembrance of its accomplishment. Fear of 
the social disintegration exemplified by many other African countries 
has produced a politics of inertia, where the preservation of an image of 
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political stability secured through the regime’s highly visible practice of 
seeming to involve as many actors as possible in matters of policy and 
decision making means that few decisions are actually made. Everyone 
thus becomes convinced that invisible forces are behind any significant 
endeavor. For most citizens it is not clear how anything happens, and in 
the rampant expansion of the sense that things are not what they appear 
to be, there is little confidence in any form of mediation that would enable 
residents to have a working sense that specific actions they undertake are 
likely to produce certain results.16
Inertia permits a facade of normality, allowing a level of economic 
accumulation that fuels a practice whereby elites from diverse regions and 
ethnicities can feel they have a stake in maintaining the system, but where 
any other substantial social development flounders. Any effort at sustained 
contestation seems haunted by the murky political machinations of the 
past, in part because the independence struggles of the 1950s and 1960s 
are not talked about. 
For example, the Unions des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), the 
key anticolonial and reunification movement in the prelude to indepen-
dence, is seldom mentioned. As colonial administrations shifted sizable 
populations to key plantation areas, there were particularly large numbers 
of francophone émigrés within areas under British control who supported 
reunification as a means to minimize their foreign status and, with local 
support, largely tempered countervailing tendencies expressed by some 
anglophone members of the southern Cameroon elite to deepen an articu-
lation with Nigeria. When the UPC was outlawed in French Cameroon in 
1955 following violent anti-French demonstrations, the party commenced 
a long and vicious guerrilla struggle. The UPC, in an adamant attempt 
to erode the various local institutions that helped underline the colonial 
divisions, was often ruthless in these efforts, estranging much of southern 
Cameroon. 
The pro-French political forces that would inherit a newly sovereign 
Cameroonian state, always lukewarm to reunification with anglophone 
southern Cameroon, supported it primarily as a means of weakening 
the UPC. The international community basically forced a decision upon 
the anglophone areas whereby independence could be attained only by 
joining either Nigeria or Cameroon — a choice that had little popular 
support. Eventually, the marriage was with Cameroon, but only because 
the impression had been widely cultivated that southern Cameroon would 
keep most of its governance institutions. What prevailed instead was a 
political disposition wherein the south was systematically marginalized, 
and the vision of the UPC to generate national institutions that would cut 
across ethnicity and region was wiped out.17 Today, the UPC is barely 
mentioned, as if a cross-cutting articulation of diverse Cameroon citizens 
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cannot be constituted as an objective of politics either in a more closely 
integrated national state or through federalism. If the aim of politics cannot 
therefore be either the enhanced autonomy of regions or greater national 
integration, what can it be? How are people to organize their sentiments 
and alliances?
In Douala, and particularly in Bepanda, the challenge faced by the 
locality is that the state itself, in order to intersect with neighborhoods 
where markets continue to renovate their practices and thus reinvigorate 
their status as sites of quiet yet persistent contestation, attempts to appro-
priate this mode of invisibility. The state attempts to penetrate into the very 
intimacy of everyday life by acting as if it is in charge of a kind of invisible 
circulation. In other words, that it possesses a capacity to bring the mun-
dane, traceable activities, contexts, and relations relaunched daily by resi-
dents to seemingly impossible intersections with unseen forces, unknown 
lives, distant places, and a whole range of unspeakable occurrences. 
The state has managed to convince many that it rules by sorcery, 
that it is able to control through deploying invisible powers that take what 
is discernible to residents and connect it to unknown events, people, and 
situations. The state plays on a basic fear incumbent in urban life: residents 
who navigate the city never can be sure how their own existence may be 
implicated in the narratives of others. They can never be sure whether their 
immediate positions and actions inadvertently place them in some line of 
fire — on a trajectory of some conveyance capable of taking them out. As 
the possibilities of mediation — the possibilities to convert differences of 
intensity, of disorder, into clearly defined sets of locations, correspond-
ing entities, and fields of reliable interpretation — diminish, the sense of 
potential harm increases. 
Yet cities, no matter how depleted and fragmented, still constitute 
platforms for trajectories of incrementalism. Houses and limited infrastruc-
ture are added onto bit by bit; the mobilization of family labor buys time for 
a small business to grow; migration is used as an instrument to pool together 
savings in order to start a new economic activity; mobile work crews are 
formed to dig wells, help with construction, or deliver goods until they make 
enough contacts to specialize on one particular activity. Incrementalism 
can produce unacceptable stratification, which can be seen across most 
neighborhoods in Douala, where some houses attain the status of villas 
while proximate ones seem to remain permanently incomplete. Certain 
actors and groups are able to organize labor, money, and contacts to finish 
roads, complete water reticulation projects, or electrify their compounds 
and neighborhoods, while others languish. Incrementalism, long an impor-
tant element of urban development policy across many cities, can provoke 
intense social conflict.18 Yet it still embodies the capacity of residents to use 
what they have and what they are doing as a base to further elaborate and 
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diversify urban social economies, as well as reflect particular interrelation-
ships with larger scale infrastructure and communication networks.
The Bepanda market is a critical locus through which negotiations 
around the inputs of goods and services are made, incorporating particular 
possibilities and practices of incrementalism. The ability of a mobile gov-
erning composite to draw in and recalibrate the attentions and affiliations 
of those using the market becomes an important tool in keeping the various 
manifestations of the incremental from becoming overly fragmentary or 
polarizing and keeps a broad swath of residents in play.
Emergency Democracy 
The prevailing policy frameworks regarding impoverished cities in the 
global South conventionally bemoan the absence of municipal structures 
adequate to socializing sustainable and appropriate uses of the urban 
environment and to enroll residents into predictable and transparent man-
agement practices. The lack of “good governance” is proffered as some-
thing nearly always self-explanatory. Yet the situation cuts both ways. 
Mediations that might have ensured the ability of residents to mark out 
daily continuities and the sense that the efforts they made were headed 
somewhere, linking residents, land, built environment, social economy, 
and institutionalized decision making, have worn away, leading to wide-
spread conviction as to the arbitrariness of events and power. It is difficult 
for more and more residents to get a sense of what could be done. At the 
same time, the weakening links connecting actions to specific connota-
tions and objects to specific utilizations permit the appearance of multiple 
thickets of operations, where the many elements that pass through mar-
kets, households, public spaces, derelict buildings, institutions, transport 
stations, and ports are reworked, recombined in heterogeneous ways that 
both compromise the integrity of the traditional responsibilities of these 
domains and interpenetrate in ways that both dissipate and extend their 
efficacy. Residents make themselves available to be taken into a wide range 
of schemes, often without any clear sense of what the payoff will be — 
yet, nevertheless, a hedge on the future — as they take others into fleeting 
operations in which they already are participants. Thus constant incor-
poration — to seize and be seized — is the predominant game. Objects and 
experiences, as well as their valuation, are realigned, and their actualiza-
tion gives rise to more unanticipated possibilities. New forms of calcula-
tion and risk are entailed, as it is not clear to participants on what basis 
any given decisions are to be made; ambiguities are promoted as they are 
also furiously sorted through in efforts to produce the impression of clear 
answers and a clear way forward. So while the performativity of urban 
space and actors may be enhanced, these intensities engender capaci-
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ties that are not easily translatable into the languages that demonstrate 
accountability, efficacy, and productivity to a larger world of multilateral 
relations. The emergency is not diminished even if it is lived through.
A long and detailed political history is at work here, although I clearly 
gloss this history that has continuously deferred state formation and turned 
much of Africa into entrepôt economies. 
With the absence of maps or the plethora of incomprehensible ones, 
everyday life can become an incessant state of emergency, in a doubled 
sense of this term. On the one hand, emergency connotes a state of alarm. It 
is a rupture in the organization of the present where normal approaches are 
insufficient, where what has transpired in the past threatens the sustenance 
of well-being at the same time that it has provided an inadequate supply 
of resources in order to deal with this threat. Emergency leaves no time 
for accounting, no time to trace out the precise etiology of the crisis, for 
the sequence of causation is suspended in the urgency of a moment where 
recklessness may be as important as caution. The past brings the commu-
nity to the brink, and at this precipice what can there be to remember?
At the same time, emergency describes a process of things in the 
making, of the emergence of new thinking and practice still unstable, still 
tentative in terms of the use to which such thinking and practice will be 
put. This is a present, then, able to seemingly absorb any innovation or 
experiment, a temporality characterized by a lack of gravity that would 
hold meanings to specific expressions and actions. There are no bearings 
and disorientation is guaranteed. Yet the crisis is dissipated: there is no 
normality to refer to, no experience of something unraveling, even though 
there is also no guarantee that the community will not return to the very 
place from which it started. So emergency connotes both the end of cer-
tain flexibility of interpretation, of the ability to put off until another day 
a reckoning of commitment and conviction now found to have been the 
wrong way to go. At the same time, this state of emergence enables, however 
fleetingly, a community to experience its life, experiences, and realities in 
its own terms — this is our life, nothing more, nothing less. Thus much 
of the process of remaking urban everyday life lies in an attention to the 
gestured, contingent, and shorthand annotation instead of the memorial; 
exchanged glances and murmurs rather than documents; deportments, 
practices, and trades — all a kind of emergency democracy.19
The city is a constant reminder of what could be but isn’t. For some, 
extraordinary efforts are made, with generosity and ingenuity, to articulate 
the disparate people and things around them in compositions of opportu-
nity. If what is attempted does not always work or seldom works, at least 
things are kept open, and there is sufficient evidence generated about the 
worthiness of effort. But such attempts are done in the face of others for 
whom the memory of what might have been possible is continuously effaced 
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in the escalating dramas of desperate transactions played out in narrow-
ing arenas. As the old conventions of making oneself a real person seem 
either to no longer apply or are under apparently permanent seizure by 
calcified political and social interests, many fellow residents are seen less 
as resources or virtuous elements than as blockages to a better future that 
already — through machinations of religious devotion, cultural entitlement, 
or inflated personal destiny — has one’s name written on it. 
So emergency democracy is not the configuration of a representa-
tional voice, and it does not so necessarily render residents or their practices 
more visible. In other words, the social architectures that residents put 
together using their time, bodies, inclinations, tools, and all the material 
stuff that exists around and within them to reach and connect to public 
necessities such as water, opportunities for income, or good times fade 
into a larger world of operations. These architectures — not easily mapped 
out with their ever-shifting topographies of openings, closures, circum-
ventions, retreats, and dissimulation — are both material and ephemeral, 
infused with shifting tactics but also a concrete shaping of bodies and 
places. They are conduits, connectors, spinning out unanticipated by-
products and opportunities. 
These experiences in Dakar and Douala demonstrate the mobilization 
of effort that continuously attempts to put the possibilities of certain stabili-
ties at risk — in contrast to investing in circumscribed, defensive posturings 
based on the localization of everyday actions and the tight specification 
of attributes required for making affiliations — so as to configure more 
extensive possibilities of collaboration. What is particularly risky about such 
maneuvers is that there are no apparent institutional mechanisms that could 
sustain the collaborations that ensue, thus relegating them to an almost 
incessant provisionality. The locus of regularity tends to be constantly 
relocated into a preparedness to do different things in different situations, 
and to simply move on to the next opportunity, dealing with whatever it 
brings. It is not so much that urban residents here embody some deep-seated 
aspiration to “be all over the place.” The dissipation of formerly relied-upon 
structures of mediation that linked individual, household, locality, and city 
has forced residents into such opportunistic actions. But once ensconced 
within them, a field of participation is opened — contested, often injurious, 
often without discernible gains — yet a field that is being replayed, and where 
constellations of power, if not upended, become more porous and tentative. 
In this way an emergency democracy is at work in the regimes that settle 
in to emergency as a mode of rule. Perhaps ironically, the aspirations for 
the city — as a place where it is possible for people to exceed the terms of 
existence previously known to them, as well as their particularistic identi-
ties of ethnicity, territory, or religion — are partially actualized in the very 
inability of the nation to do the job it was supposed to do.
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